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Abstract  
Over the past 20 years web browsers have 
changed considerably from being a simple text 
display to now supporting complex multimedia 
applications. The client can now enjoy chatting, 
playing games and Internet banking. All these 
applications have something in common, they can be 
run on multiple platforms and in some cases they will 
run offline. With the introduction of HTML5 this 
evolution will continue, with browsers offering 
greater levels of functionality. This paper outlines the 
background study and the importance of new 
technologies, such as HTML5’s new browser based 
storage called IndexedDB. We will show how the 
technology of storing data on the client side has 
changed over the time and how the technologies for 
storing data on the client will be used in future when 
considering known security issues. Further, we 
propose a solution to IndexedDB’s known security 
issues in form of a security model, which will extend 
the current model. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This paper attempts to answer several questions. 
Firstly, what is HTML5 IndexedDb; where did the 
technology come from, and what motivated its 
development; what is its current status and what is 
inhibiting its take up, and finally, what is the future 
for HTML5 IndexedDb. 
HTML5 is the latest W3C standard for the 
language in which web pages are written. It also 
defines Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) 
that are expected to be provided by a web browser 
that supports HTML5. The motivation for the 
changes and enhancements coming with HTML5 is 
that the web browser should be capable of running 
browser based applications in the same way that it 
supports desktop applications. That is, client side 
processes will be able to avoid the ineffectiveness and 




applications and the inherent visual instability caused 
by their required web page refreshes. Consequently, 
major browsers now support the majority of the new 
HTML5 components and APIs. Therefore, HTML5 
browser based storage may well contain stored data 
from online services that makes use of the new 
HTML5 functionality [1]. The process of accessing 
this data might in some cases be slow, due to network 
latency or database query process [2].  It is suggested 
that this new level of browser based storage will 
ensure that such HTML5 enabled browsers are going 
to be a significant target for cyber-attacks [3].  
Web browsers store history, and other data using 
cookies on client computers, which is attractive for 
those marketing products or services. Being browser 
based is critical for developers, because modern 
browser based web applications are able to store large 
amount of data and access that data much faster than 
any server side database. Consequently, HTML5 
opens up entirely new security challenges and issues 
[4]. As is well known, user information is tracked on 
every move on the Internet. eCommerce sites store 
customer details, orders and saved products, sites 
store cookies on user computers to track returning 
customers. The data can be later used for marketing 
purposes and to target new customers. Sometimes 
consumers and the general public do not realize the 
quantity of personal data that is shared over the 
Internet and how that data can be used or misused. 
Data privacy and information leakage is then a 
serious concern. 
 
2. Importance of IndexedDB 
 
In this section we consider the drivers behind 
HTML5 IndexedDB. That is, why the technology was 
considered at all, and what motivates current 
standard. We proceed as follows, firstly we overview 
the status of eCommerce, with particular attention to 
its mobile variant mCommerce. Then we consider 
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The term eCommerce began to be widely used in 
early 2000, and it is defined as commercial 
transactions conducted electronically on the Internet, 
such as purchasing goods and services online. 
eCommerce has a significant and positive impact on 
businesses everywhere [5,6]. The eCommerce market 
grew slowly until 2007 when its proportion of GDP 
was about 3%, but the biggest expansion happened in 
the last decade when the retails sales increased to 40 
%. In 2012, eCommerce accounted for 18% (£492 
billion) of UK business turnover. 21% of UK 
businesses in 2012 made eCommerce sales to their 
own country; 9% of UK businesses made  
eCommerce sales to EU countries and 7% to non-EU 
countries based on the Office of National statistics 
(ONS) [7]. Of the United Kingdom's total £1.45 
trillion GDP, the Internet value chain represented 
2.6% of GDP, and the eCommerce conducted over it 
a further 3.1%. The UK boasts 54.6 million Internet 
users and has a penetration rate of 86%, with a typical 
user spending 42 minutes per week browsing virtual 
stores and buying on the web. The use of 
eCommerce, by both organizations and individual 
consumers continues to grow, as more people are 
connected to the Internet and with the increased 
availability of fibre broadband. 
eCommerce has several advantages over offline 
stores and mail catalogues.  Online stores eliminate 
the 3rd party middleman costs required by wholesalers 
and distributors. It also removes the overheads of 
physical shops, both of which lower operational 
costs. eCommerce stores also provide search 
functionality so that a customer is looking exactly the 
item for which they are looking. Additionally, 
customers can easily browse through large amounts 
of products and services eCommerce has been 
expanded to the business to business (B2B) and 
business to consumer (B2C) [8] markets. Many 
retailers have moved to invest in online sales that 
target more online customers in categories such as 
electronics, books, and transport. eCommerce gives 
retailers an opportunity to expand outside their 
domestic markets with minimum upfront investment 
[9]. Consumers can also see prices, allowing simple 
price comparison and can then place orders quickly. 
eCommerce stores allow the customer to add 
products to a wish list, which can then be sent to 
friends or family to be paid for.  
Consumers can also check existing online product 
reviews and compare prices before buying any goods 
or services. Some of the eCommerce stores provide 
video product reviews where the customer can see the 
product in action without the need to leave the house. 
One of the most important advantages of eCommerce 
stores is access to the global market and the creation 
of new business opportunities Online stores can be 
available to everyone everywhere. For most 
businesses the eCommerce is an excellent alternative 
supply channel that is cost effective but continuously 
can reach consumers directly and extensively. The 
Internet helps companies to engage in eCommerce by 
collecting, storing, and exchanging personal 
information obtained from visitors to their websites 
[10].  eCommerce stores can target customers in 
many ways, most widely used is by email and online 
ads. This way has a cost advantage over offline 
stores, where print flyers must be produced. 
eCommerce can target a greater number of customer 
in a shorter space of time, as everything is done 
electronically. eCommerce retailers have also 
advantage of through popular social media to attract 
new customers. Additionally, online retailers use 
customer buying habits to target new and existing 
customers with social media advertisements and 
special offers. Since the late 90’s it was predicted that 
every step on the Internet could be traced and that this 
information might be stored [11]. Information from 
web browsing is stored in the browser history, 
eCommerce sites store user preferences and shop 
orders to better understand the customer with the aim 
of targeting advertising at them for related products 
or services. [12]. 
 
2.2. The importance of mobile commerce 
(mCommerce) 
 
HTML was first focused on the desktop computer, 
since when the web started in 1993 mobile (cell) 
telephones did not have Internet connectivity. Tablet 
computers (e.g. the Grid Compass) were a rarity and 
limited to specialised applications. In 2015, 
combined, mobile phones and tablets now account for 
38% of all web pages served globally (StatCounter). 
Smartphone user penetration in 2011 was 9.6%, 
whilst by 2015 it is 28%. Here in UK the mobile 
penetration rate is 72%.  
The U.K. Internet ecosystem is worth £82 billion a 
year, with mobile connections accounting for 16% of 
this. mCommerce sales will continue to grow at a 
double-digit rate until 2017 when it is expected to 
reach £17.2 billion and drive over 26% of online 
retail sales. Since 2007 mCommerce sales have 
rapidly grown from less than 5% to 21% of sales in 
2015, which opened a new market for online stores. 
Online stores needed to change their strategy and 
embrace the mobile market. 
Businesses operating over the Internet need to 
maintain relations with their customers to ensure 
continuity, recognize previous customers, and 
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2.3. Cookies 
 
Cookies are small quantities of data that are stored 
by websites in the client browser, and sent to that web 
site with each http request. Cookies were introduced 
by Netscape Communications in 1994 in their 
Netscape Navigator Browser. Cookies allow users to 
store their sessions and state with websites.  
eCommerce applications use cookies to store 
customers’ preferences. This both makes the online 
buying experience more convenient and focused as 
cookies allow the tracking of customer preferences. 
Cookies support functionality such as customer 
shopping carts and the recognition of returning 
customers who are then recommended appropriate 
products and made offers using individually tailored 
marketing. 
The problem with cookies is privacy since third 
party applications could potentially steal information 
from cookies.  There are also several security issues 
with cookies such as cookie poisoning [13], and 
cookie injection. Cookie poisoning attacks involves 
the modification of the cookie contents (user IDs, 
passwords, account numbers, time stamps) in order to 
bypass security mechanisms. Using cookie-poisoning 
attacks, attackers can gain unauthorized information 
about another user and steal their identity. Cookie 
injection attacks inject a cookie string or code into the 
HTTP header to modify server page execution, which 
may lead to SQL injection attacks [14].  
The Cookie Law is the result of a EU directive in 
2011 and enacted into law across the majority of the 
European Union. It requires websites to obtain 
visitors’ agreement to store or retrieve any 
information on a computer, smartphone or tablet [15]. 
It was designed to protect online privacy, by 
making consumers aware of how information about 
them is collected and used online, and give them a 
choice to allow it or not.  
Cookies are limited in size to 4KB, and therefore 
are rarely used to directly store site-specific 
information. Rather, a typical cookie will store a 
unique database key. That key will usually point into 
the web server’s customer database that is not 
accessible publicly. That database may contain any 
amount of information about the customer including 
their personal details, transaction and purchase 
history, preferences and so on. Cookies, and their 
limitations in size and flexibility, have lead to the 
specification and development of HTML IndexdDB. 
 
3. Current state of IndexedDB 
 
Browser storage has been proposed in HTML5 to 
extend the cookies functionality to provide web 
developers and web applications with better 
alternatives to store data locally. With browser based 
storage eCommerce companies can store user 
preferences, shopping cart and product images 
locally. This can help eCommerce applications to 
speed up the process of loading products and 
displaying them to end-users.  
By using browser-based storage, eCommerce sites 
can also be used offline. The user will have the ability 
to add products to a shopping cart, even if the 
network connection is down. The greatest advantage 
of using offline storage is with mobile devices, where 
network connectivity and data caps are a concern. 
If a Web service allows only a certain number of 
calls per hour but the data does not change that often, 
web applications could store the information in local 
storage and so help prevent mobile users breaching 
data limits [16]. Online stores could save new images 
every six hours, rather than every minute, which 
would improve the bandwidth utilization. 
Local caching keeps users from being banned 
from services, and it also means that when a call to 
the Application program interface (API) fails, user 
will still have information to display. For example, 
shopping cart data could be stored locally and 
synchronized with the eCommerce site when network 
connectivity is restored.   
The main problem with HTTP as the main 
transport layer of the Web is that it is stateless. This 
means that when an application is closed, its state will 
be reset the next time is opened. If an application on 
the desktop is closed and then re-opened, its most 
recent state is restored. Local storage is better than 
cookies since it allows for storage across multiple 
windows. It also has better security and performance 
and data will persist even after the browser is closed 
[17]. Therefore, local storage provides functionality 
similar to that of desktop applications, where 
application state is persistent. 
In 1995 Netscape Corp’s vision of the future was 
to run multimedia application, spreadsheets and word 
processing programs from the web browser. 
Netscape’s main product was a browser (Naviagator), 
which was written to run across multiple operating 
systems (Windows, Unix, and Macintosh). The vision 
was that application would run on the top of any 
operating system with their sets of APIs, so that third 
party applications developers would not need to 
worry about the underlying operating system and 
hardware. These days, Netscape’s vision is a reality, 
where applications like YouTube and Facebook can 
be run from any web browser.  
As the HTML5 standard evolved, new browser 
based storage concepts were introduced. These are 
targeted at storing larger data volumes. Additionally 
they have satisfied the key non-functional 
requirement of speed, since stored data was not 
transmitted with every HTTP request, whilst cookies 
are. HTML5 provides two new features to store data 
locally. The first browser based storage feature is 
called ‘local storage’. It allows the storage of 
information locally within a web browser in object 
stores, which are persistent and stored on disk. The 
storage is limited to 5MB and the stored data is in 
name/value pairs.   
International Journal of Intelligent Computing Research (IJICR), Volume 6, Issue 4, December 2015
Copyright © 2015, Infonomics Society 623
IndexedDB is another HTML5 browser based 
storage technology. It is a NoSQL (Not only SQL) 
[18], asynchronous, key-value browser-based data 
store, where NoSQL is an approach to databases that 
is not relational or object oriented. Rather, NoSQL 
stores data in key/value format. The database can 
handle a large amount of data. IndexedDB supports 
an API that offers fast access to unlimited amount of 
structured data. IndexedDB may be considered to be 
insecure, since security was not considered in its 
specification. In a previous paper [19] we have 
described how standard forensic tools may be used to 
identify data stored, and then deleted from 
IndexedDB data stores. 
IndexedDB, which was previously known as 
WebSimpleDB came from the W3C specification of 
implementing web storage into web browser in 2009. 
IndexedDB is a persistent client-side database 
implemented into browser and is an alternative to 
WebSQL, which has been deprecated.  Mozilla and 
Microsoft supported the introduction of IndexdDB, 
which was most influenced by Oracle's Berkley DB. 
The application uses local data stored on a client 
system [20]. It caches large data from server to the 
web browser client using JavaScript Object Stores, 
which may be considered to be equivalent to tables in 
relational databases. 
Files and data stored by the browser are retained 
on the user file storage system, on the user's computer 
hard drive. The client-side database, IndexedDB, 
stores the data, even when the browser terminates. 
IndexedDB is then a persistent client-side database, 
which means that the data can be retrieved even the 
browser is offline. Therefore, the files reside on the 
user file system and can be recovered until other files 
overwrite them. IndexedDB treats file data just like 
any other type of data. An application can write a File 
or a Blob into IndexedDB, as well as storing strings, 
numbers and JavaScript objects. This is detailed in 
the IndexedDB specifications and, so far, 
implemented in both the Firefox and Chrome 
applications of IndexedDB. Using this, storing all 
information in one place and a single query to 
IndexedDB can return all the data. 
In Firefox and Chrome’s IndexedDB 
implementation, the files are stored transparently 
external to the actual database; in other words, the 
performance of storing some data in IndexedDB is 
just as efficient as storing it directly in the OS 
filesystem. Storing files does not extend the database 
size and slow down other operations. Moreover, 
reading from the file means that the implementation 
reads from an OS file. The Firefox IndexedDB 
implementation is even smart enough to recognize if 
is storing the same Blob in multiple files. If this 
happens it creates only one copy. Writing further 
references to the same Blob just adds to an internal 
reference counter. This is completely transparent to 
the web page, so it writes data faster while using 
fewer resources. 
Browser based storage such as IndexedDB can be 
used on multiple browsers and is cross platform 
compatible. Web applications can take advantage of 
using IndexedDB on desktop, mobile and tablet, 
without additional programming. Web applications 
can use browser-based storage without the need for 
network connections. The HTML5 standard provides 
the functionality where data can be stored on client 
machine, and can be accessed anytime without the 
need of network connection.  
An important aspect of HTML5 is that the web 
applications can run offline using local storage. The 
advantage of HTML5 compared to desktop programs 
is that web applications do not require any installation 
or start-up configuration and will also run on any 
device that supports HTML5, such as laptops, phones 
or tablets. In an eCommerce scenario, this reduces the 
entry barrier to new customers since customers can 
begin taking advantage of web applications just by 
visiting the relevant web site. 
IndexedDB extends local storage by providing 
web applications with offline storage. This may be 
used by eCommerce stores to store customer 
preferences without sending these with every HTTP 
request. Consequently, HTTP request and response 
traffic will decrease and customer preferences or 
other information will be accessed only when 
requested. An important aspect of HTML5 is that the 
web applications can run offline using local storage. 
This means that client data will be stored on user’s 
browser and accessed anytime that the application 
requires. Offline storage and cached pages provide a 
better user experience, since network latency is 
minimal.  
The new HTML5 IndexedDB functionalities bring 
new security issues, since there is increased access to 
the client computer’s resources. One of the biggest 
disadvantages or disappointments is that the new 
standard does not provide any additional security. 
HTML5 video and audio are replacing third party 
application as Adobe and closing a common attack 
vector with FLASH applications or plug-ins. 
Additionally HTML5 provides greater access to 
computer resources, which includes local storage, and 
therefore opens new opportunities for attacks. 
The problem with the current browser based 
storage, such as IndexedDB is that there is concern 
that another application on the client computer may 
also access that offline data. To prevent web 
applications from reading each other’s data, a 
mechanism known as the same origin policy (SOP) 
applies to all of the web storage technologies. By 
implementing the same origin policy, browsers check 
and record the origin of all the data they store based 
on the hostname of the web application 
(www.example.com), the port number on which the 
web application runs (80) and the protocol through 
which the data was delivered (typically http or https). 
When a web application wants to access data stored 
locally, the browser will check the current origin and 
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the origin of the data and only allow access if these 
match. Data is protected through the use of the same 
origin policy.  
The SOP is the only form of browser protection 
against potential security threats. SOP works by not 
allowing access to client data from sources that could 
be deemed to be the original source, perhaps by the 
use of cross-site scripting (XSS) for example. That is, 
if applications in multiple windows or frames are 
downloaded from different servers, they should not 
be able to access each other’s data and scripts 
(Takesue, 2008). The prevention of data or attacks 
coming from a different domain is possible. Web 
browsers are using this prevention technique against 
untrusted site attacks. Attackers use multiple 
techniques that can easily inspect the browser history 
or get data of another domain. 
From the experiments performed, we have 
confirmed IndexedDB stores data as received, so that 
it is not encrypted. However, this is not the only 
problem. Browser based storage faces another issue, 
where the deleted data is not fully deleted from the 
hard drive. With the help of standard forensic tools 
we were able to restore current and deleted 
IndexedDB data from both desktop and mobile 
drives. 
The issue of restoring deleted data just extends the 
security concern of storing data in unencrypted state, 
where the attacker could get multiple versions of 
browser based local storage. The deleted data persists 
on the hard drive and when delete data request is 
executed, the data is just marked as deleted but still 
occupies the associated space. A further data storage 
request just assigns additional disk space but the old 
data will persist on the hard drive and it will be not 
overwritten. 
We have than a complex scenario with 
IndexedDB. It has the advantages of persistence, 
storage size, and better network utilization, but the 
disadvantages of security weakness.  
 




Cross origin resource sharing (CORS) is a 
mechanism that allows JavaScript on a web page to 
make XMLHttpRequests (XHR) to another domain, 
not the domain the JavaScript originated from. XHR 
is an API available to web browser scripting 
languages such as JavaScript. It is used to send HTTP 
or HTTPS requests to a web server and load the 
server response data back into the script. 
Normally, web browsers would otherwise forbid 
such ‘cross-domain’ requests. CORS defines a way in 
which the browser and the server can interact to 
determine whether or not to allow the cross-origin 
request. By letting third party applications accessing 
the data created with other domains application can 
lead to security issues, such as information leakage. 
Therefore user agents must implement Cross-origin 
resource sharing with IndexedDB in greater security 
details. Also, CORS expands on the design of the 
Same Origin Policy. Each resource declares a set of 
origins, which are able to issue various kinds of 
requests (such as DELETE, INSERT, UPDATE) to, 
and read the contents of, the resource. CORS is a 
“blind response” technique controlled by an extra 
HTTP header (origin), which, when added, allows the 
request to reach the target. This means, that an 
application creates an IndexedDB database, which is 
saved with the domain name. Another application can 
not access the database files, as the access is 
restricted for the particular domain. This attack is 
based on bypassing the Same Origin Policy and 
establishing cross-domain connections to allow the 
deployment of a Cross-site Request Forgery attack 
vector. We mention a CORS attack, which can be 





Cross-site scripting is one of the most popular web 
application attack, third on the OWASP list. 
WhiteHat security has provided a statistic report 
where XSS regains the number one vulnerability in 
web applications. XSS is popular attack, because 
even the web application is secured the attack rely on 
the end user, which can be tricked to click a link and 
therefore authorize the attack. 
XSS is taking advantage of web applications, 
where the user input is not filtered properly. Cross 
site scripting filtering is a process of filtering out 
parameter values that look suspicious, this includes 
special characters. Attackers may also manipulate 
indirect inputs such as session variables and database 
records. This can be prevented with sanitizing or 
validation of user input. XSS is an attack technique 
that forces a Web site to display malicious code, 
which then executes in a user’s Web browser. 
New client side database provide the functionality 
to store data on user machine. Stored data might 
contain information, which is considered sensitive, 
such as user personal information.  If a web 
application is vulnerable to XSS attack, then an 
attacker could get access to client side storage. The 
client side storage data can be accessed through the 
browser, so the execution of XSS attack might output 
the stored data. 
 
4.3. Social engineering attacks 
 
Social engineering is the art of manipulating 
people so they give up confidential information. The 
attackers usually trick people into giving them 
passwords or bank information, or access to computer 
to secretly install malicious software with the purpose 
access information or control. Attackers use social 
engineering tactics because it is usually easier to 
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exploit human nature to trust than it is to discover 
ways to hack web applications or software. For 
example, it is much easier to fool someone into 
giving the attacker their password than it is trying to 
hack their password.  
Example of social engineering can be a email from 
a friend. If attacker manages hack or socially 
engineer one person’s email password, then the 
attacker would have access to the victim contact list. 
The attacker can send email or leave message to 
victim’s contacts list with a link, which could be 
result that the victims computer will be infected by 
malware or the victim is redirected to attackers site. 
The link could also contain a download, such as 
picture, movie, document, or audio file that has 
malicious code embed in. When the victim 
downloads the file, the victim’s computer will be 
infected and the attacker could have access to victims 
machine, emails, accounts and contacts. 
 
4.4. Physical Access 
 
Physical access is possible when the attacker has 
the physical contact to user machine. When the 
device or stored data is unencrypted, the attacker 
might get access to all data. Physical access controls 
to the location where the computers are kept. 
Employees who are authorized to work in that 
location can use either a RFID card or some magnetic 
stripe or barcode on their ID badge to gain access 
through a locked door. This allows the accesses to the 
location to be assessed on a per employee basis. 
When considering physical access, the attacker or any 
person with access to the filesystem could potentially 
get the file and the data, which will mean that it could 
be transferred to an external drive and used with the 
appropriate application. 
Possible solution to prevent an unauthorized 
person to gain access to filesystem is to lock the 
screen, where a password would need to be entered 
before any of the files could be viewed.  
 
5. Encryption for IndexedDB 
 
The future of IndexedDB is to support secure of 
browser-based offline usage. Existing browser-based 
storage has not become popular with web developers, 
because they face several problems.  The first 
problem is the complexity of code required, where 
the developers need extra time to understand the 
structure. Saying that, there are many online tutorial 
examples, which can help developers to start 
implementing browser, based storage into their web 
applications. 
The second problem with IndexedDB is security. 
Currently IndexedDB stores data in an unencrypted 
state so that is neither protected, nor securely deleted. 
Therefore IndexedDB storage cannot be 
recommended for the storage of personal information. 
This makes it limited in functionality. As with data 
stored on desktop, mobile or tablet in an unencrypted 
state, an attacker can get the data without bypassing 
any protection. For example, with a Cross-site 
scripting attack (XSS), such as hidden in email link 
an attacker could find the stored data. IndexedDB is 
inherently vulnerable to such attacks.  
Security flaws are inevitable when considering 
web applications and storage of information. This is 
due not only to the sophistication of the attacks, but 
also to the fact the many attacks, such as cross-site 
scripting, are based on social engineering and exploit 
human error, so are extremely difficult to protect 
against.  Browser based storage security design is a 
concern, but that can be corrected. The correction is 
to use JavaScript client side encryption, which would 
mean that browser based storage is at least as secure 
as that on the server. 
With the implementation of the encryption library 
in the browser (Firefox v. 29) we are hoping to 
address the ineffectiveness of the insecure storing of 
data. We are going to propose and develop an 
algorithm, which will be implemented into the 
Mozilla Firefox browser in an extension format. Also, 
our algorithm will ensure that the database 
transaction for storing or retrieving data will only be 
possible when a secure and valid authentication is 
completed. This also relies upon providing the private 
key to encrypt/decrypt data. 
We have proposed a security model, which will be 
implemented as a browser extension. The proposed 
security model extends that of the current web 
browser. Furthermore, we have implemented a 
browser extension with a client side encryption 
library, which will help to secure the data on a 
client’s machine. When an application requests a new 
transaction for IndexedDB to open the database and 
save data, the proposed library extension will encrypt 
the data. This data will then be as safe as the 
encryption scheme even should an attacker get 
physical access to the device, which would happen if 
a laptop were lost, or a mobile handset stolen. 
Steps to encrypt the data are: 
a)Get a secure Login 
The first step is to provide a secure login 
functionality, which can be provided by the web 
application. The web application will use the login 
process to authenticate a user and securely log the 
user into system. 
b)Encrypt data 
When an application requests a new transaction for 
IndexedDB to open the database and save data, the 
designed encryption library extension will encrypt the 
data. This way the data will be stored in an encrypted 
state and will not be readable to others.  
c)Store public and private key 
When the data is encrypted a key will be generated 
and stored with the user information on the server.  
Client-side encrypts sensitive data using the public 
key, which will be generated and stored on the server 
side. This public key is used when encrypting 
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information using the JavaScript library. When 
Client-side encryption is enabled, an RSA keypair is 
generated and the user will be given a specially 
formatted version of the public key. RSA is the 
algorithm that is used to encrypt data with a private 
key to produce a digital signature. The private key, 
however, is never revealed to the user or anyone else. 
The data is decrypted using the keypair’s private key. 
Public and private keys are created simultaneously 
using the same algorithm (RSA- Rivest-Shamir-
Adleman). Private keys are used to decrypt text that 
has been encrypted with a public key. 
d)Decryption of data 
When the user requests to read the data from the 
database, the web application will check user’s 
credentials (if the session is active) and get the key 
from the server to allow decryption of data.  
e)User Authentication 
Upon successful authentication, the user will be given 
a public key, which will be used for the 
encryption/decryption of the data. This private key 
will be stored on the server side, with all the user 
information which is used for decrypt the data. We 
are going to use OAuth 2, which is an open standard 
for authorization. This will be used to securely 
transfer the private key from the server to the 
encryption library. 
f)Deletion of data 
Secure deletion of data will be required to overwrite 
the space of data with zeros. This means that the data 
cannot be read again, as all of the values are set to 
zero. 
If running over HTTPS, then things are more secure 
as the browser will detect a modified JavaScript file. 




Hashing and encryption can be done within 
browsers through the JavaScript encryption library. 
Algorithm will use a JavaScript encryption library 
(proposed Stanford JS Encryption Library), where the 
library will be implemented into the browser 
(Firefox) as an extension. This extension will be 
based on the top of IndexedDB API and therefore 
every time during the reading or writing of data, the 
data will be encrypted. The library consists of 
encryption with private and public keys. The private 
key will be saved on the server.  The public key will 
be given to the user and stored on the user’s machine, 
the same way as a cookie. The extension will provide 
encryption/decryption of data on the user’s machine, 
which will resolve the issue of storing data in an 
unencrypted state. 
 
5.2. Algorithm Used 
 
It differs from typical AES implementations 
(different approach that keeps the code small and 
speeds up encryption/decryption). The source code 
for the AES algorithm, also called Advanced 
Encryption Standard or the Rijndael algorithm. The 
benchmarking tests have shown that the Stanford JS 
Encryption library performs faster than other client 
side encryption libraries. The benchmark has been 
achieved in multiple browsers on Windows, Mac and 
Linux Operating Systems. One of the reasons we 
proposed to use and implement the library into 
algorithm was the speed and multiplatform usage. 
The algorithm is going to contain the JavaScript 
encryption library, which will be implemented into 
the browser. The algorithm will consist of a few 
steps, with the higher security. This will allow the 
end user to save and retrieve data from IndexedDB. 
The data will be encrypted with the JavaScript library 
and a private and public key will be used to 




The model will add an extra layer between the 
web browser and IndexedDB API. The security 
model consists of an algorithm framework, which 
adds extra protection against issues identified, by 
reading each other’s data through XSS 
vulnerabilities. 
Algorithm is using JavaScript encryption library 
(proposed Stanford JS Encryption Library), where the 
library is implemented into the browser (Firefox) as 
an extension. This extension is placed on the top of 
IndexedDB API and therefore every time during the 
reading or writing of data, the data will be encrypted. 
The library consists of encryption with private and 
public keys. As expected, the private key will be 
saved on the server. The public key will be given to 
the user and stored on the user’s machine, the same 
way as a cookie. The extension will provide 
encryption/decryption of data on the user’s machine, 
which will resolve the issue of storing data in an 
unencrypted state. It will also provide better security 
for possible attacks, where the attacker can 
manipulate with user data. 
The browser based local storage security model 
(BBLS) is relying on the web browser security model 
(WBSM), which is using Same origin policy. The 
security mechanism is not enough to preserve the 
security confidence among the end user. 
The BBLS security model differs from WBSM in 
few ways, which includes the security mechanism. 
The main difference is that BBLS security model is 
trying to secure the data between browser and the end 
user file system, where comparing to WBSM, which 
is securing the data between web applications and 
user browser. 
The goal of BBLS security model is to secure the 
data, which is stored in client side database. User 
should be able to visits other websites, without they 
databases to be compromised.  
The current WBSM is not sufficient protection for 
complex web application and stored data on client 
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side is becoming more important.  
The security model consists of an encryption 
framework, which will help to secure the data. The 
encryption framework cannot though provide full 
security protection. We argue that such protection is 
not achievable in a single machine, since any single 
browser could be the target of an XSS attack. 
Therefore, functionality external to be browser needs 
to be implemented. For implementation to existing 
encryption library we will use Multifactor 
authentication (MFA). MFA is used to make the 
authentication process more secure by adding an 
extra layer of security. The extra authentication will 
need to be passed to make sure the encryption library 
decrypts the data. Mobile two-factor authentication 
use phones to replace fobs or software-based tokens 
that were commonly used for remote authentication. 
When a person tries to log into an online service, a 
security pin is sent to his or her mobile phone via 




To evaluate the security model, we will run tests to 
conclude the effectiveness of the model. This will 
include attacks, which will be bypassing the SOP 
trough XSS attacks. First we will perform and attack 
with existing security, without applying the security 
model. 
Then we will add the security model, and perform 
the attack again. We suggest that the model will 
prevent an attacker to read data from other source, by 
adding the authentication process to place. Also the 
data stored will be encrypted, which means that even 
the authentication process is compromised, the data 
will not be available to read in unencrypted state. 
Based on our findings, we can state that there is a 
case for browser-based databases. We have 
implemented a JavaScript encryption framework, 
which is a part of the security model implemented into 
the browser in a form of an extension. The proposed 
security model extension addresses the security issue 
that IndexedDB has as a product of its design. Also, 
the implemented security model fulfils the security 
requirements.  
 
6. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
Based on these findings, we can state, that there is 
a case for browser-based databases. Browser based 
databases though face security problems over and 
above those on the server, and this has inhibited their 
uptake. Nevertheless, despite the existing issues faced 
by browser-based storage, there is a future for the 
technology due to its convenience, performance, 
reduced reliance on continuously available network 
connection.  
Considering the issues and concerns of storing 
data locally, browser based storage has the potential 
to be widely used, where the main advantage is the 
performance speed, cross platform (desktop, mobile, 
tablet) and browser availability. The advantages of 
local storage outweighs the disadvantages, keeping in 
mind that the issues identified can be corrected and 
browser-based storage can be widely used by 
developers without any concerns of security issues 
introduced as by design limitations. 
Although the proposed security framework has 
been successfully applied to browser based local 
storage, further improvements can be made in 
extending the security and performance model. These 
could be addressed by extending the current model to 
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